Criminal Law and Corrective Services

The applicant applied to the Tribunal claiming that the Queensland Police Service were directly discriminating against him by placing alerts, warnings and flags on his personal profile on their internal database. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was held not to apply as the events in question occurred prior to its commencement. The Tribunal noted that the evidence did not meet the standard required to make any findings of a contravention of human rights.

​​​​​​​An action for judicial review was brought by a prisoner in relation to two decisions: the decision to impose a maximum security order (MSO) for a further six months (following seven years of being subject to such an order); and the decision to impose a no association order. The applicant claimed that the decision-maker breached the obligation to make decisions consistently with human rights, and to consider human rights in the making of decisions. The applicant failed to make out the claims with respect to the right to protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or the right to liberty and security of person, but was successful in making out the claim in relation to the right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty.  

The Attorney-General applied for a supervision order pursuant to ss 13(5)(b) and 16 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) in relation to the respondent, who was convicted of serious sexual offences. The court noted the respondent’s right to a fair hearing (s 31 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)) when considering the appellant’s submissions, which were not considered further.

This case concerned an application for an extension of time for leave to appeal against a sentence, in which the applicant relied on the right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 34 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)). The Queensland Court of Appeal held that the argument faced ‘insurmountable hurdles’ and dismissed the application.

This case concerned an appeal against a decision of Flanagan J in April 2020 to refuse the appellant’s application for bail. The appellant argued that his detention was arbitrary and unlawful and that he had the right to a trial without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 29(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).

This case concerned an appeal against a decision of Flanagan J in April 2020 to refuse the appellant’s application for bail. The appellant argued that his detention was arbitrary and unlawful and that he had the right to a trial without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 29(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).

The self-represented applicant sought leave to appeal against sentences imposed upon him by the District Court on the ground that his sentence was manifestly excessive.

The court considered an application for a no-jury trial and whether it is in the interests of justice for the trial to proceed on a judge alone basis. The right to be tried without unreasonable delay (Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 32(2)(c)) was considered relevant, but there was no substantive discussion of the right or its application.

The court considered an application for a no-jury trial and whether it was in the interests of justice for the trial to proceed on a judge alone basis. The right to be tried without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 32(2)(c) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was considered relevant, but there was no substantive discussion of the right or its application.

The court considered an application for a no-jury trial and whether it was in the interests of justice for the trial to proceed on a judge alone basis. In written submissions, Counsel for the applicant raised the applicant’s right to be tried without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 32(2)(c) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Horneman-Wren SC DCJ discussed the relevance of this right in the context of the application and ordered that the trial proceed on a judge alone basis.