Criminal Law and Corrective Services

This case concerned an application for an extension of time for leave to appeal against a sentence, in which the applicant relied on the right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 34 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)). The Queensland Court of Appeal held that the argument faced ‘insurmountable hurdles’ and dismissed the application.

This case concerned an appeal against a decision of Flanagan J in April 2020 to refuse the appellant’s application for bail. The appellant argued that his detention was arbitrary and unlawful and that he had the right to a trial without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 29(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).

This case concerned an appeal against a decision of Flanagan J in April 2020 to refuse the appellant’s application for bail. The appellant argued that his detention was arbitrary and unlawful and that he had the right to a trial without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 29(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).

The self-represented applicant sought leave to appeal against sentences imposed upon him by the District Court on the ground that his sentence was manifestly excessive.

The court considered an application for a no-jury trial and whether it is in the interests of justice for the trial to proceed on a judge alone basis. The right to be tried without unreasonable delay (Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 32(2)(c)) was considered relevant, but there was no substantive discussion of the right or its application.

The court considered an application for a no-jury trial and whether it was in the interests of justice for the trial to proceed on a judge alone basis. The right to be tried without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 32(2)(c) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was considered relevant, but there was no substantive discussion of the right or its application.

The court considered an application for a no-jury trial and whether it was in the interests of justice for the trial to proceed on a judge alone basis. In written submissions, Counsel for the applicant raised the applicant’s right to be tried without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 32(2)(c) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Horneman-Wren SC DCJ discussed the relevance of this right in the context of the application and ordered that the trial proceed on a judge alone basis.

The self-represented applicant appealed against two convictions for driving over the prescribed speed limit, stating that the Magistrates who handed down the convictions had erred with respect to section 35 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), which concerns the right to protection against retrospective criminal laws. During oral submissions, the Applicant abandoned this ground of appeal and the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was not further mentioned in either of the proceedings.

Pursuant to section 13 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), the Attorney-General applied to the court for either a continuing detention order or a supervision order in relation to the respondent, Carter, who was convicted of serious sexual offences. The court noted that supervision orders limit the right to liberty and freedom of movement contained in sections 29 and 19 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), but that they did so to fulfil the statutory purpose of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) relating to  the safety of the community.

The respondent applied for a no jury trial in circumstances where measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic had prevented all new jury trials from proceeding. The respondent raised the right to be tried without unreasonable delay in section 32(2)(c) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The court found that the appropriate consideration was whether the making of a no jury order was ‘in the interests of justice.’