human rights case notes

The court considered an application for a no-jury trial and whether it is in the interests of justice for the trial to proceed on a judge alone basis. The right to be tried without unreasonable delay (Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 32(2)(c)) was considered relevant, but there was no substantive discussion of the right or its application.

The court considered an application for a no-jury trial and whether it was in the interests of justice for the trial to proceed on a judge alone basis. The right to be tried without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 32(2)(c) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was considered relevant, but there was no substantive discussion of the right or its application.

The court considered an application for a no-jury trial and whether it was in the interests of justice for the trial to proceed on a judge alone basis. In written submissions, Counsel for the applicant raised the applicant’s right to be tried without unreasonable delay pursuant to section 32(2)(c) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Horneman-Wren SC DCJ discussed the relevance of this right in the context of the application and ordered that the trial proceed on a judge alone basis.

In these proceedings, the Australian Institute for Progress sought an order that the Electoral Commission of Queensland pay their costs despite the Institute being unsuccessful in their application for declaratory relief. The Institute argued that this case warranted departure from the general rule that costs follow the event because the proceedings were of public interest and provided useful commentary on the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld). Applegarth J held that there was no sufficient reason to depart from the general costs rule and the Institute was ordered to pay the Commission’s costs.

The self-represented applicant appealed against two convictions for driving over the prescribed speed limit, stating that the Magistrates who handed down the convictions had erred with respect to section 35 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), which concerns the right to protection against retrospective criminal laws. During oral submissions, the Applicant abandoned this ground of appeal and the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was not further mentioned in either of the proceedings.

A former prisoner applied for leave to appeal and appeal of a decision in which she experienced discrimination on the basis of her gender identity during her incarceration in a male prison. Pursuant to section 108, the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was found to not apply because the Tribunal’s decision was made prior to the commencement of the Act.

The applicant relied upon the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association contained within section 22 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) in seeking declaratory relief against the respondents. There was, however, no in-depth analysis of this provision provided in the Commission’s decision.

This case concerned the right to a fair hearing, particularly the right to have all judgments or decisions made by a court or tribunal publicly available pursuant to section 31(3) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The applicant sought an order that his name be suppressed to protect his mental health, and the Tribunal ordered a non-publication order on this basis.

This case concerned a complaint made on behalf of five-year-old Cyrus Taniela that his school’s decision to discontinue his enrolment for the second semester of 2020, unless he cut his hair to satisfy the school’s uniform policy, amounted to discrimination on the basis of race and sex. The applicant also argued that several human rights provided for in the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) were relevant to the discrimination experienced by Cyrus: recognition and equality before the law (section 15); freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (section 20); the rights of children (section 26(2)); cultural rights (section 27); and the right to education (section 36). 

Pursuant to section 13 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), the Attorney-General applied to the court for either a continuing detention order or a supervision order in relation to the respondent, Carter, who was convicted of serious sexual offences. The court noted that supervision orders limit the right to liberty and freedom of movement contained in sections 29 and 19 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), but that they did so to fulfil the statutory purpose of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) relating to  the safety of the community.